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NOTES AND COMMENTS
we may have to discard all analogies and decide the issue by looking
to the equities of the case.26
ARNOLD T. WOOD
Dedication-Acceptance of Streets in Subdivision-Public User
X, owner of a subdivision, sold lots therein by reference to a
recorded map which showed the location of the lots and streets. Y
owned a lot outside the subdivision upon which he built a home. He
then opened his driveway onto a street in the subdivision. Although
this subdivision street, which connected two public highways, had
been regularly used by Y and other members of the general public
for at least two years, it had never been accepted or maintained by
public authority. When X barricaded the street, cutting off access
to Y's driveway, Y obtained a mandatory injunction for reopening
the street. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Owens v. Elliot,'
reversed. The court held that an effective dedication to the property
owners within the subdivision had been made, but as to the general
public there was only an offer of dedication, requiring formal accept-
ance by the proper public authorities before Y, as a member of the
general public, acquired a right to use the street.
When streets are shown on a recorded plat or map of a sub-
division two types of interests are created.2  First, purchasers of
bills which had been paid by the defendant under automobile medical pay-
ments insurance. The defendant's comprehensive insurance policy also con-
tained a liability clause for payment on behalf of defendant of any tort lia-
bility within policy limits. The medical payments clause called for payments
directly to injured persons regardless of the insured's negligence. The court,
after stating the majority view that recovery could be had under both clauses,
refused to allow a double recovery on the theory that there should be but
one recovery for one injury reghrdless of what the source of the compen-
sation.
8As stated by Lord Denning, M.R., in the principal case: "I prefer . . .
to discard . . . analogies and ask myself the simple question: is it fair and
just that, in assessing compensation, regard should be had to the fact that
Sergeant Browning is already, as of right, in receipt of nearly half his pay?
And my answer is, 'Yes.' He ought not receive compensation twice over.
If he had remained in the Air Force, he would not have received both his pay
and his pension. Nor should he do so now." [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 58.
1 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962). This case was before the court
on appeal in 257 N.C. 250, 125 S.E.2d 589 (1962), where a judgment for
damages was reversed. It was remanded to determine the injunction issue
in light of pertinent evidence.
2 See, e.g., Russell v. Coggin, 232 N.C. 674, 62 S.E.2d 70 (1950), where
the court stated, in effect, that when an owner subdivides and sells in refer-
ence to a plat or map, he dedicates the streets to the public in general and the
purchasers in particular. See generally 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL Con-
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lots within the subdivision acquire a fixed right of ingress and egress
immediately upon conveyance, and the grantor is estopped to deny
them the use of the streets already laid out.3 Secondly, the general
public acquires an interest through dedication.4
In many states dedication of subdivision streets is usually accom-
plished by the recording of a plat or map of the subdivision in accord-
ance with an express statutory scheme.5 North Carolina has no
such statute.6 Consequently, dedication is accomplished here in
accordance with long-established common-law principles. By analogy
to the law of contracts a completed common-law dedication requires
PoRA-ToNs § 33.24 (3d ed. 1949) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1103 (3d ed.
1939).
'See 11 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.24; 4 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 1103; 31 N.C.L. Rv. 202 (1953). It is generally agreed
by the courts and treatise writers that the purchasers' rights to the unimpeded
use of subdivision streets is not obtained by dedication, since technically
there can be no dedication except to the public. However, more often than
not this distinction is not made, and the purchasers' rights are loosely in-
cluded in the term dedication. There need not be acceptance in any manner
by the public or public' authorities for the purchaser to enforce his rights.
Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943).
'An Oregon case illustrates one court's distaste with this distinction.
"Many of the courts, in discussing this subject, have made too great an effort
to discriminate between such purchasers and the general public. The former
are not a distinct class from the latter; they belong to it; are as much a
part of the public as those who use the streets for the purposes of travel ....
[T]hey would, so far as I can see, represent the public in the affair as much
as a like number of wayfarers who travel upon such streets, and have equal
authority to accept a dedication of them for the public." Meier v. Portland
Cable Ry., 16 Ore. 500, 509, 19 Pac. 610, 615 (1888).
Dedication is generally defined as devotion of land to a public use by an
unequivocal act of the owner of the fee, manifesting an intention that it
shall be accepted and used presently or in the future. See, e.g., Manning v.
House, 211 Ala. 570, 100 So. 772 (1924); Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Town
of Stratford, 145 Conn. 268, 141 A.2d 241 (1958); City of Miami Beach v.
Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172 (1943); City
of Kingman v. Wagner, 168 Kan. 558, 213 P.2d 979 (1950). See generally
11 McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.02.
'E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 505.01 (1947). Even in those states with
statutory dedication there may still be common-law dedication. E.g., Louis-
ville & N.R.R. v. City of Owensboro, 238 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1951); City of
Hardin v. Ferguson, 271 Mo. 410, 196 S.W. 746 (1917).
The term dedication, of course, includes both the statutory and common-
law types. Where necessary to distinguish between the two it is generally
surmised that a statutory dedication operates in the nature of a grant of an
easement, while a common-law dedication operates by way of estoppel in
pais. See generally 1 ELLIOT, ROADS AND STREETS § 125 (4th ed. 1925) ; 11
MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.03.
6 The only statute in North Carolina expressly dealing with the subject
merely provides a method of withdrawal of a street after it has been effec-
tively dedicated but not used within fifteen years of the dedication date. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1958).
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an offer of dedication and' an acceptance by the public.7 The offer,
based on: the dedicator's objective intent, may be indicated in a num-
ber of ways.' One of the most widely acknowledged methods, with
which North Carolina is in full accord,' is by subdividing land and
making sales with reference to a recorded map or plat.10  The ma-
jority view is that a sale of lots in a subdivision settles the rights
between the seller and buyer, but, as to the general public, the offer
to dedicate remains revocable at will until there has been some act
of acceptance on the part of the public." In discussing the public
acceptance sufficient to complete dedication of subdivision streets, the
North Carolina court has stated the rule in various ways. Typically
it is said that the public acceptance must be in some "recognized legal
manner."' 2 This rule is deceptively simple due to the evasive mean-
" Gault v. Town of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E. 104 (1931) ;
Irwin v. City of Charlotte, 193 N.C. 109, 136 S.E. 368 (1927); Wittson v.
Dowling, 179 N.C. 542, 103 S.E. 18 (1920); Elizabeth City v. Commander,
176 N.C. 26, 96 S.E. 736 (1918); Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 25, 76 S.E. 505
(1912). See generally 11 McQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.43.
8 E.g., by written instrument expressly for that reason, Gallagher v. City
of Detroit, 262 Mich. 298, 247 N.W. 188 (1933); by recitals in a deed in
which the rights of the public are recognized, Neill v. Hake, 254 Minn. 110,
93 N.W.2d 821 (1958); by oral declarations, Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Dorsey, 111 Fla. 22, 149 So. 759 (1932); by affirmative acts of the owner
in connection with his property, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Donalsonville
Grain & Elevator Co., 184 Ga. 291, 191 S.E. 87 (1937); by acquiescence of
the owner in the public use of his property for a public purpose, City of
Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 33 Wash. 2d 496, 206 P.2d 277
(1949).
'Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898
(1956); Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537, 80 S.E.2d 266 (1954); Lee v.
Walker, 234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1952); Foster v. Atwater, 226 N.C.
472, 38 S.E.2d 316 (1946); Evans v. Home, 226 N.C. 581, 39 S.E.2d 612
(1946); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943); Home
Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 7
S.E.2d 13 (1940); Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N.C. 685, 163 S.E. 803
(1932). The rule announced in this line of cases is, in effect, that the process
of subdividing, platting, and selling lots in a subdivision amounts to a dedi-
cation of the streets therein to the use of the purchasers of such lots and
the general public.
"There is virtually no conflict among the jurisdictions on this point.
McQuillan calls it "one of the clearest ways of declaring an intention to
dedicate." 11 McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.30. But see 4 TIrFANY,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 1003, for a mild criticism.
" McQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.45. Tiffany disagrees with
McQuillan and makes the statement that the weight of authority is that
once sales are made in reference to a plat, a dedication effected thereby can-
not be revoked even though there has been no indication of an acceptance by
the public. He criticizes this rule because it eliminates the necessity of
acceptance by the public. 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1106. To be
sure, there is at least agreement that there is disagreement.
" Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962); Gault v. Town
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ing of the words "acceptance" and "recognized legal manner." This
evasiveness has led to a state of confusion in North Carolina con-
cerning public user'--one of the universally recognized modes of
acceptance, and the one relied on by the plaintiff in the Owens case.14
The usual modes of acceptance of an offer of dedication are'
(1) by formal or express acts of public authorities; (2) by implica-
tion from acts of public authorities; (3) by implication from user
by the public for the purpose for which the property was dedicated. 1
North Carolina has recognized these three methods,'0 but often the
third has been disregarded." Where there has been an attempt to
impose liability on a public authority for repairs and maintenance of
streets, no doubt the omission has been deliberate." In this context
public user is properly not a "recognized legal manner" of accept-
ance. Much of the confusion has been caused by the indiscriminate
application of this principle of non-recognition of public user to cases
in which imposition of liability on a public authority is not involved.'9
The principal case is a prime example.
It is generally held in North Carolina that a public highway, in
the sense that the public is responsible for its maintenance, may be
established only by (1) regularly instituted proceedings by public
authorities; (2) user by the public and control by public authorities
of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E. 104 (1931); Wright v. Town
of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 616, 158 S.E. 99 (1931).
"Although unable to find "public user" anywhere precisely defined, a
reading of numerous cases indicates that it can range from mere use of
dedicated land by members of the public, to public use with the additional
element of maintenance and repair by a public authority. Maintenance in
this context is carried on without any formal authorization and, therefore,
is also considered to be an ingredient of "public user."
' Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 2, 3.
" Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898
(1956), cited in 11 MCQuJILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.47.
" Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, supra note 15, at 367, 90 S.E.2d
at 901; Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N.C. 542, 545, 103 S.E. 18, 19 (1920).
"' Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 317, 128 S.E.2d 583, 586 (1962) ; Scott
v. Schackelford, 241 N.C. 738, 743, 86 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1955); Chesson v.
Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1944); Stewart v. Frink,
94 N.C. 487, 488 (1886) ; Kennedy v. Williams, 87 N.C. 6, 8 (1882).
"8 There is a split of authority as to whether mere public user is sufficient
to impose liability on a. public authority for repairs and maintenance. 11
McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.50; 4 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1107. McQuillan takes the stand that user should be sufficient, basing this
on the ground that the public is in realiiy the municipality, while the principal
officers are merely agents of the public. North Carolina has never decided
this point.
19 See note 18 supra.
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for twenty years; or (3) dedication by the owner with the sanction
of public authorities which have accepted it.2" When this rule is
coupled with the doctrine of acceptance of dedication by public user -
in a context other than an attempt to impose liability on the public for
maintenance, formal recognition of the latter rule is practically
vitiated.22 Upon analysis it becomes clear that the two rules are,
directed at different ends and should not be invariably construed
together. The rule of public user is directed toward the dedicator
and makes his offer of dedication irrevocable. The rule concerning
establishment of public highways is directed toward state agencies
and defines the manner in which a duty of public maintenance is
created. This duty carries with it tort liability for negligent failure to
properly maintain the street.23  But the creation of a right in the
public to use a dedicated street does not necessarily impose a con-
comitant duty on the public to maintain it.2" In such a case the
public is free to use the dedicated street as a public highway but at
2' Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962) ; Scott v. Shackel-
ford, 241 N.C. 738, 86 S.E.2d 453 (1955) ; Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289,
29 S.E.2d 906 (1944); Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193
S.E. 153 (1937); Stewart v. Frink, 94 N.C. 487 (1886); Kennedy v. Wil-
liams, 87 N.C. 6 (1882).
"1 In cases not involving streets in a subdivision North Carolina has recog-
nized user as a proper device for accepting a dedication. Draper v. Conner
& Walters Co., 187 N.C. 18, 121 S.E. 29 (1924); Penland v. Barnard, 146
N.C. 378, 59 S.E. 1109 (1907) ; Crump v. Mims, 64 N.C. 767 (1870).
2That the doctrine of user and this rule can exist together is not ques-
tioned. However, this is true only in contexts in which it was originally'
employed, that is, where the intent of the owner to dedicate is in issue. In-
tent, either express or implied through conduct, is the fundamental prerequi-
site of an offer to dedicate. Draper v. Conner & Walters Co., supra note 21.
"Savannah Beach, Tybee Island v. Drane, 205 Ga. 14, 52 S.E.2d 439
(1949); Richmond v. City of Marseilles, 154 IIl. App. 345 (1910); State v.
Wilson, 42 Me. 9 (1856); Kennedy v. City of Cumberland, 65 Md. 514, 9
Aft. 234 (1886); Chapman v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 146 Mich. 23, 109
N.W. 53 (1906); Cincinnati & M.V.R.R. v. Village of Rosevill, 76 Ohio
St. 108, 81 N.E. 178 (1907); City of Winchester v. Carroll, 99 Va. 727, 40
S.E. 37 (1901); Pence v. Bryant, 54 W. Va. 263, 46 S.E. 275 (1903).
Contra, Makepeace v. City of Waterbury, 74 Conn. 360, 50 Atl. 876
(1902); City of Hammond v. Maher, 30 Ind. App. 286, 65 N.E. 1055
(1903); Dunn v. City of Oelwien, 140 Iowa 423, 118 N.W. 764 (1908);
Phelps v. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276 (1877); Benton v. City of St. Louis,
217 Mo. 687, 118 S.W. 418 (1909) ; Sweeney v. Village of Newport, 65 N.H.
86, 18 AtI. 86 (1889); Ackerman v. City of Williarrisport, 227 Pa. 591, 76
At. 421 (1910); City of Austin v. Ritz, 72 Tex. 291, 9 S.W. 884 (1888);
Cady v. City of Seattle, 42 Wash. 402, 85 Pac. 19 (1906).
2' Gilbreath v. City of Greensboro, 153 N.C. 396, 69 S.E. 268 (1910);
Jones v. Town of Henderson, 147 N.C. 120, 60 S.E. 894 (1908); State v.
Fisher, 117 N.C. 733, 23 S.E. 158 (1895).
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their 6wh risk.25 , Tort liability may be voluntarily assumed by the
municipality or public' authority but it cannot be forced upon them.
Another oft-used doctrine is that a person who purchases a lot
on the outside boundaries of a subdivision has no rights in respect
to the dedicated streets of that subdivision other than those enjoyed
by the general public.,26 One can hardly take issue with the rule
standing alone. However, when used in the context of the principal
case it begs the question. The landowner in the principal case be-
came a "user" of the street as a member of the general public and,
therefore, played his part in aiding consummation of the dedication.
Confusing the issue still further is the subtle intrusion of the law
of prescriptive easements into the domain of dedication. This handy
tool was employed in the principal case by simply stating that the
mere permissive use of a way over land does not imply a dedicatory
right in the public to unimpeded use." Doubtless the rule is validly
applied to create an easement of passage over land where there is
adverse user. However, user in prescription is not at all analogous
to user in dedication.28 Prescriptive user must contain an element
of hostility and an absence of acquiescence by the owner, at least for
twenty years.29 The easement is created by use which has the same
2 See, e.g., Palmer v. East River Gas Co., 115 App. Div. 677, 101 N.Y.
Supp. 347 (1906), where this point was made with unusual clarity by a
concurring judge who said, "Though a street used by the public generally
be not an official one, so that the city is under duty to keep it in repair, and
liable for damages for dangerous defects in it, it may nevertheless be a public
street in the sense that the public have and exercise the right of travel over
it, such right being conferred by the owner of the land in the street by dedi-
cation, such as granting the land abutting on it by conveyances bounding
on the street as shown by a map."
' Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 538 (1962) ; Janicki v. Lorek,
255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961); Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212
N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937).
"' The case cited to support this proposition, Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C.
289, 29 S.E.2d 906 (1944), concerned an easement and not dedication.
2 A most succinct discussion of the dissimilar elements of user in pre-
scription and user in dedication is found in Drimmell v. Kansas City, 180
Mo. App. 339, 168 S.W. 280 (1914). On this point the court said, inter alia,
"The throwing open of land to public use as a street without other formality
is sufficient to establish the fact of dedication to the public and if individuals
become interested to have it continue so, the owner cannot resume it. To
establish dedication by prescription in this state, user for ten years must be
shown; but a valid common-law dedication may be shown by an act of dedi-
cation and of the animus dedicandi without reference to the period of use."
Id. at 344, 168 S.W. at 281.
" Nicholas v. Salisbury Hardware & Furniture Co., 248 N.C. 462, 103
S.E.2d 837 (1958) ; Henry v. Farlow, 238 N.C. 542, 78 S.E.2d 244 (1953) ;
Whitacre v. City of Charlotte, 216 N.C. 687, 6 S.E.2d 558 (1940); Darr v.
Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939); Hemphill v.
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characteristics as adverse possession. A dedicator affirmatively
manifests an intent for the public to use his property. Adverse user
is simply not in play.3" The language in the principal case further
illustrates a commingling and confusion of the two doctrines by add-
ing the requirement of use for twenty years in a context involving
acceptance of an offer of dedication of subdivision streets.3 This is
wholly incorrect. It is generally accepted that, in a situation where
the owner has made an express offer of dedication, length of time
of use is not controlling and has nothing to do with the period of
adverse use necessary for a perfected prescriptive easement.32 It is
merely evidence of the intent of the public to accept the dedication.33
More important evidence of acceptance is the sufficiency of the char-
acter of the use, such as whether the land has been used for the pur-
pose for which it is dedicated, and whether the quantum of use is
Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937); City of Durham v.
Wright, 190 N.C. 568, 130 S.E. 161 (1925); Draper v. Conners & Walters
Co., 187 N.C. 18, 121 S.E. 29 (1924). In some cases the two doctrines have
been correctly distinguished. After a finding of insufficient intent to dedicate,
the court has examined the facts to ascertain whether the conditions prece-
dent for prescriptive easement have been met. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Salis-
bury Hardware & Furniture Co., supra.
" Transue v. Croffoot, 179 Kan. 219, 294 P.2d 216 (1956); City of
Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 33 Wash. 2d 496, 206 P.2d 277
(1949). Where, in addition to acceptance, there is a question of intent to
dedicate, the two doctrines are more nearly parallel. In that instance some
courts have drawn an analogy to prescription and have often required a
satisfying of the same elements, including adverseness and use for a twenty
year period. Feuer v. Brenning, 201 Misc. 792, 115 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct.
1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1033, 112 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y.
881, 110 N.E.2d 173 (1953).
" The court cited Scott v. Shackelford, 241 N.C. 738, 86 S.E.2d 453
(1955) ; Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 29 S.E.2d 906 (1944) ; and Hemp-
hill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937). These cases
deal with prescriptive easements, not dedication.
" Tise v. Whitaker-Harvey Co., 146 N.C. 374, 59 S.E. 1012 (1907).
Acceptance may be shown by proof of public use for a lesser period of time
than that required for prescriptive easements or adverse possession. Fitz-
hugh v. Goforth, 228 Ark. 568, 309 S.W.2d 196 (1958); City of Venice v.
Short Line Beach Land Co., 180 Cal. 447, 181 Pac. 658 (1919) ; W.T. Congle-
ton & Co. v. Roberts, 221 Ky. 712, 299 S.W. 576 (1927); North Beach v.
North Chesapeake Beach Land & Improvement Co., 172 Md. 101, 191 AtI.
71 (1937).
"Gunn v. Fontes, 148 Cal. App.2d 351, 306 P.2d 928 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d
553 (1950); Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107
S.E.2d 806 (1959); Henry Walker Park Ass'n v. Mathews, 249 Iowa 1246,
91 N.W.2d 703 (1958); North Beach v. North Chesapeake Beach Land &
Improvement Co., supra note 32. Length of time of user is more important
and consequently may be required to continue for a longer period of time
when also relied on to create a presumption of dedication. City of Kansas
City v. Burke, 92 Kan. 531, 141 Pac. 562 (1914).
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consonant with the potential use in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances. 34
In the final analysis the status of the doctrine of acceptance of
dedication by user in North Carolina is confused. The decided cases
have left a wake of conflicting statements and strangely amalgamated
concepts which do not entirely agree with the better reasoned authori-
ties. At least in the context of the principal case,35 a simple solution
would be to acknowledge that the general public, relying on the
manifested intent to dedicate streets in a subdivision, could make the
offer irrevocable by user without thereby imposing a duty of mainte-
nance on the public authorities.
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.
Insurance-Contribution Rights under G.S. § 1-240
Of extreme practical importance to the practicing bar is the con-
tribution statute, G.S. § 1-240,1 around which a maze of question-
able procedural rules has been judicially constructed.' Considerable
"E.g., Dormont Borough Appeal, 371 Pa. 84, 89 A.2d 351 (1952) (use
only by residents of immediate neighborhood, insufficient acceptance by gen-
eral public).
" The finding of an incomplete dedication in the principal case may well
have been supportable on the facts, even if the court had recognized user as
a mode of acceptance. Even so, it would seem that a discussion of user and
the weighing of the factors that combine to determine whether there has
been sufficient user was necessary to correctly reach the final result.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953) provides in effect that "(1) those who
are jointly and severally liable as judgment debtors, either as joint obligors
or as joint tort-feasors, may pay the judgment and have it transferred to a
trustee for their benefit, and such transfer shall have the effect of preserving
the lien of the judgment against the judgment debtor who does not pay his
proportionate part thereof to the extent of his liability; (2) joint tort-feasors
against whom judgment has been obtained may, in a subsequent action there-
for, enforce contribution from other joint tort-feasors who were not made
parties to the action in which the judgment was taken; (3) joint tort-feasors
who are made parties defendant, at any time before judgment is obtained,
may, upon motion, have the other joint tort-feasors made parties defendant;
(4) joint judgment debtors who do not agree as to their proportionate lia-
bility, by petition in the cause, in which it is alleged that any other jointjudgment debtor is insolvent or a nonresident and cannot be forced under
execution to contribute to the payment of the judgment, may have their
proportionate liability ascertained by court and jury; and (5) joint judgment
debtors who tender payment of judgment and demand in writing transfer
thereof to a trustee for their benefit, and are refused such transfer by judg-
ment creditors, may not thereafter have execution issued against them upon
said judgments." Gaffney v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 518,
184 S.E. 46, 47 (1936).
' See 40 N.C.L. Rlv. 633 (1962).
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